We study the licensing incentives of an independent input producer owning a patented product innovation which allows the downstream …rms to improve the quality of their …nal goods. We consider a general two-part tari¤ contract for both outside and incumbent innovators. We …nd that technology di¤ usion critically depends on the nature of market competition (Cournot vs. Bertrand). Moreover, the vertical merger with either downstream …rm is always privately pro…table and it is welfare improving for large innovations: this implies that not all pro…table mergers should be rejected.
Introduction
We study the licensing incentives of an independent input producer owning a patented product innovation which allows the downstream …rms to improve the quality of their …nal goods. We consider a general two-part tari¤ contract for both outside and incumbent innovators. We endogenize market structure as in Sandonis and Faulì-Oller (2006) allowing the patent holder to vertically integrate with either downstream …rm. We also provide the welfare analysis.
More precisely, we consider two downstream …rms producing and selling a …nal output to heterogeneous consumers and two di¤erentiated inputs in the upstream market, a low quality input provided by competitive …rms and a high quality patented input provided by an independent input producer. The quality of the …nal good depends on the quality of the input. Complete technology
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We …nd that technology di¤ usion critically depends on the nature of market competition (Cournot vs. Bertrand). When …rms compete in the quantities, the innovation is sold to all …rms thus ensuring complete technology di¤usion as well as a homogeneous good in the market. In contrast, when …rms compete in the prices, the innovator has no incentive for complete technology di¤usion, rather he prefers exclusive licensing which implies a vertically di¤erentiated market and in turn positive industry pro…t to extract. In particular the internal patent holder does not license its innovation to the rival …rm; the external patent holder sells only one license via a …xed fee.
As far as the merger pro…tability is concerned, we show that under Cournot competition the vertical integration of the upstream inventor with either downstream …rm is always privately pro…table. This result is in line with the new market foreclosure theory (see Rey and Tirole 2007) according to which vertical integration allows the monopolist upstream producer to protect its monopoly power. This result is in contrast with Sandonis and Faulì-Oller (2006) that consider non-drastic process innovations in a horizontally di¤erentiated Cournot duopoly and …nd that the merger is privately pro…table only for small innovations. They point out the commitment problem faced by the vertical merger (that is the insider innovator) which has only one instrument, the licensing contract to the rival …rm rather than two (a licensing contract to each downstream …rm), and cannot credibly restrict its output as the new input is transferred at marginal cost. However this result breaks down in our model as the incentive to di¤use the innovation makes homogeneous the downstream market. As for social welfare pro…tability, we …nd that under Cournot competition the merger is also welfare improving for large innovations; this implies that not all pro…table mergers should be rejected. Indeed on one hand, the merger pushes prices down as it implies the (partial) internalization of the vertical externality; on the other hand, the merger has an anticompetitive e¤ect because the vertically integrated …rm is able to (partially) foreclose the rival …rm via a positive per-unit royalty. The …rst e¤ect prevails as long as the quality improvement associated with the innovation is su¢ ciently large. Under Bertrand competition, we …nd a result of equivalence between an external and an internal patent holder, both in terms of private and social welfare pro…tability. Indeed, an external patent holder sells an exclusive license via a …xed fee, so that there is no distortion due to a positive per-unit royalty (as the patent holder were vertically integrated). This way the patent holder maximizes the licensee's pro…t and extract this pro…t up to the outside option.
This paper contributes to the literature on licensing a product innovation as well as to the debate on the competitive e¤ects of vertical integration.
From a theoretical viewpoint, most of the literature on optimal licensing focuses on cost-reducing, process innovations (see Kamien and Tauman, 1986; Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Kamien, Oren and Tauman, 1992; Sen and Tauman, 2007; Erutku and Richelle, 2007) . To our knowledge, little has been done to investigate the issue of licensing a product innovation. 1 In particular, we …nd that under Cournot competition with homogeneous goods, the external patent holder optimally speci…es positive per-unit royalties when the innovation is large. This is in line with the wide prevalence of per-unit royalties over …xed fee in practice (see for instance, Rostoker (1984) ). Moreover, Muto (1993) studies optimal licensing of a process innovation and shows that Bertrand competition is a rationale to explain this empirical evidence. We argue that this theoretical result does not hold for a product innovation: in our model the external patent holder prefers …xed fee over royalty licensing.
As for the competitive e¤ects of vertical integration, there are two opposite views. The Chicago School (e.g., Bork, 1978; Posner, 1976) stresses that, in the absence of e¢ ciency gains, vertical integration could not increase the profitability of merging …rms (Rey and Tirole, 2007) . In contrast the new market foreclosure theory stresses the role played by vertical integration in restricting downstream competition. We show that the social welfare pro…tability depends on the innovation size.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we set up the ante-innovation model. In Section 3 we introduce the product innovation and we study the licensing incentives of an external innovator. In Section 4 we consider the optimal strategy of an internal innovator. In Section 5, we compare the private and social incentives. In Section 6 we extend the analysis to Bertrand competition.
Model
We consider two …rms producing a homogeneous good and competing à la Cournot. 2 Final output production requires an essential input provided by a competitive upstream market.
As far as the demand side is concerned, we assume that there is a continuum of consumers indexed by which is uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1]. Thus, is a taste parameter. Each consumer has a unit demand and buys either one unit of a good of quality s at price p or buys nothing at all. Consumer's utility takes the following form:
The demand for the good is then
1 However, as pointed out by Kamien et al. (1988) "a product innovation can be regarded as a cost reducing innovation by assuming that the new product could have been produced before but with a su¢ ciently high marginal cost that rendered its production unpro…table."
2 Given a homogeneous …nal good, price competition leads to the Bertrand paradox. We extend the analysis to Bertrand competition in Section 6. where Q = q 1 + q 2 and p=s is the fraction of consumers with a taste parameter less than , that is the fraction of consumers not buying the good. 3 For future reference we de…ne the consumer surplus as
As for the supply side, the essential input of quality s is produced at zero …xed cost f L = 0 and at constant marginal cost c = 0 and it is sold at the competitive price w = 0. In this framework quality is assimilated to input. The D …rm i pro…t function is: i = pq i . D …rms compete in the quantities, then the Cournot duopoly equilibrium is (superscript C stands for Cournot):
The D …rms'price and pro…ts depend on the quality of the input s. The D …rms sell Q = q 1 + q 2 = 2 3 which is the demand for the input faced by the upstream market (perfect vertical complementarity).
For future reference (and as a benchmark) consider the monopoly outcome for this market:
Innovation
Suppose that an independent input producer obtains a patented product innovation which allows the downstream …rms to improve the quality of their …nal goods. In the upstream market there is now a monopolist selling an input that ameliorates …nal product quality by > 1 that measures the innovation size. Assume production cost is f H = f > 0 for the high quality input. We study the licensing incentives of this patent holder. The U …rm can sell the new input either to one or both D …rms via a two-part licensing contract 3 At equilibrium the market is not covered. 4 The monopolist maximization problem would be maxp [p (1 p=s)].
(r; F ).
5 Di¤erent cases derive:
1. Complete technology di¤ usion: both D …rms adopt the new input and we have a homogeneous …nal good of quality s > s. D …rms' pro…ts i (c i ; c j ; s ; s ) depends on the two part-tari¤ contracts c i = (r i ; F i ) with i = 1; 2 and i 6 = j.
Exclusive licensing: only one of the D …rms adopt the new input and we
have two …nal goods of di¤erent qualities. The non-innovating …rm, say …rm 1, produces the low quality good thus incurring zero production costs and gains 1 (0; c 2 ; s; s ); while the innovating …rm 2 produces the high quality good and gets 2 (c 2 ; 0; s ; s).
We develop a three-stage game: …rst, the innovator o¤ers a contract to each D …rm on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; second, the potential licensees decide whether to accept or reject the contract; …nally the D …rms compete. Solving backwards, we …nd the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Exclusive licensing
Suppose that only one D …rm adopts the new input. Firm 1 does not buy the new input and produces a …nal good of quality s 1 = s at price p 1 ; …rm 2 adopts the new input and produces a …nal good of quality s 2 = s > s, at price p 2 with s 2 s 1 = s ( 1). The demands for the goods are:
where
The inverse demands are:
D …rms pro…ts are:
A two-part licensing contract covers both the case of the royalty and the case of the …xed fee licensing modes: a royalty can be seen as a two-part tari¤ with F = 0; the …xed fee can be seen as a two-part tari¤ with r = 0.
Cournot competition leads to the following third stage quantity and price equilibrium:
with q 2 (r 2 ; 0; s ; s) > 0 ()
Firm1 pro…t is then:
As for …rm 2:
The U …rm chooses the two-part tari¤ contract for …rm 2 (r 2 ; F 2 ) such that:
with U = (2s s 2r2) s(4 1) r 2 + F 2 f . The …rst constraint comes from the nonnegativity of q 2 and the second constraint (binding at equilibrium) ensures that …rm 2 has the incentive to get the license rather than the status quo. The solution is a contract such that r 2 = 0 and F 2 = (36
. Remaining equilibrium variables are (superscript EL stands for exclusive licensing):
EL U is the U patent holder equilibrium pro…t under exclusive licensing, when selling via a two-part tari¤, which reduces to a …xed fee, the new input to only one D …rm. For completeness we provide equilibrium consumer surplus under exclusive licensing:
Complete technology di¤usion
Suppose the U …rm decides to sell the new input to both D …rms via a two-part tari¤ (r; F ). The U …rm maximization problem is: where 1 (0; r 2 ; s; s ) is de…ned in (7) . Here the outside option for each …rm is not buying the new input given that the rival …rm does. i (r i ; r j ; s ; s ) and q i (r i ; r j ; s ; s ) denote the third stage equilibrium D …rm i pro…t and quantity when both …rms produce the high quality good, namely:
q i (r i ; r j ; s ; s ) = 1 3s
(s 2r i + r j ) :
As the two constraints are binding at equilibrium, we have . The maximization problem, thus becomes:
The optimal contract is then:
3 )
, F (r 1 ; r 2 ) = (248
This means that when the innovation is small the inventor's incentive is to set a per-unit price as low as possible, that is the optimal contract is a …xed fee. In contrast for large innovations we have a positive per-unit royalty. 6 Equilibrium magnitudes are for > 1:585 6 (superscript T stands for complete technology di¤usion): 
The optimal contract is speci…ed in (10) .
A consequence of the innovator's preferences towards technology di¤usion is that the downstream market is not vertically di¤erentiated, as only the high quality input is sold to both …rms. In other words, the downstream market is characterized by a homogeneous good.
Comparing total quantities, prices, pro…ts and consumer surpluses, we …nd the following rankings.
Vertical integration
We have considered so far, the case of an external innovator, i.e. the U …rm does not sell the …nal good in the D market. Suppose now that the U producer and one of the two D …rms, say …rm 2, merge, in this case the vertically integrated (VI) …rm is an internal patent holder and its pro…t consists of two parts: the pro…t from selling the new input to the rival D …rm 1 (if it decides to license) and the pro…t from selling the high quality …nal good 2.
We consider the following three-stage game: …rst, the patent holder o¤ers a contract to D …rm 1, D …rm 1 decides whether to accept it and …nally market competition takes place.
Proceeding backwards, consider the quantity competition between the VI …rm and …rm 1 producing the same high quality …nal good. The VI …rm has zero variable production costs as the new input is trasferred at the marginal cost c 2 = 0, whereas …rm 1 incurs marginal cost r 1 : 
2 , obtained from (7) is …rm 1 outside option, that is …rm 1 pro…t if it does not buy the new input thus selling the low quality …nal good and incurring per-unit cost equal to zero. As the …rst constraint is binding at equilibrium, we have:
f V I (0; r 1 ; s ; s ) + r 1 q 1 (r 1 ; 0; s ; s ) + 1 (r 1 ; 0; s ; s ) 1 (0; 0; s; s )g
If we let the VI …rm to set negative fees, the vertical merger implements the monopoly outcome by inducing the nonintegrated …rm to produce a nil quantity (foreclosure) and compensating it for the outside option. Equilibrium magnitudes are: However negative fees would be clearly held to be illegal by antitrust authorities. It is clear from the analysis above that the VI …rm wants to restrict as much as possible the quantity produced by the non a¢ liate …rm so as to (at least) partially internalize the vertical externality. If the VI is constrained to nonnegative fees, it will optimally let the nona¢ liate …rm to produce a positive quantity q 1 (r 
(4 1)
Equilibrium magnitudes are: We gather the above results as follows.
Proposition 2 Under Cournot competition, the internal patent holder always sells the innovation to the rival …rm. The optimal contract is speci…ed in (11) .
San Martin and Saracho (2010) consider a non drastic process innovation and show that in a Cournot duopoly with homogeneous goods the optimal licensing mode is an ad valorem royalty, that is a pro…t sharing agreement. This result does not hold in our model: as we prove in the Appendix the ad valorem licensing mode is dominated by the two-part tari¤ contract de…ned in (11) . The intuition behind this result is as follows. In San Martin and Saracho (2010) the ad valorem royalty is optimal as the internal patentee introduces the process innovation that increases total quantity (it let the rival …rm to produce with a more e¢ cient technology) and then appropriates the rival's pro…t up to its outside option. In our model if the innovation is di¤used via an ad valorem royalty total output does not increase (as under homogeneous goods it is independent of the quality, see the status quo equilibrium quantity, expression 3). This implies that industry pro…ts correspond to the duopoly pro…ts that are shared according to . Whereas under two-part tari¤ the internal patentee can at least partially internalize the negative externality coming from competition and approach the monopoly outcome.
Private and social pro…tability of vertical integration
We next consider the merger pro…tability as well as the social welfare comparing the vertical integration scenario with the vertical separation scenario (i.e., external patent holder) where complete technology di¤usion takes place. As far as the private pro…tability is concerned, the merger is always profitable, namely: 
:
This result is in line with the new market foreclosure theory according to which VI allows the U producer monopolist to protect its monopoly power. 9 As for the social pro…tability of VI, we make the following comparisons. For
< 0.
For > 1:585 6, CS
We can conclude that for > 3:407 8 both the industry pro…t and consumer surplus are higher under VI, that is vertical integration is welfare improving. In contrast for < 3:407 8, the result is ambiguous as consumer surplus is lower but producer surplus is higher under VI rather than the nonmerger case. However direct computations of social welfare (SW = CS + P S) reveal the following.
We gather our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Vertical integration is always privately pro…table. However it is welfare improving if and only if the innovation is su¢ ciently large, namely > 3:407 8.
Sandonis and Faulì-Oller (2006) consider non-drastic process innovations in a horizontally di¤erentiated Cournot duopoly and study the patentee incentives to merge with either …rm in the market. They show that the merger is privately pro…table for small innovations and it is welfare improving for large innovations. They argue that all pro…table mergers are welfare detrimental, this also holds for homogeneous goods. More precisely, Sandonis and Faulì-Oller (2006) individuate the following trade-o¤: an internal patentee (VI case) better internalizes market pro…t with respect to an external one, however the patentee can only use one instrument (a contract for the other …rm in the market) rather than two (a contract for each …rm in the market). An external patentee has two instruments but it has to care about …rms' outside option which depends on the royalty, in particular it increases with the royalty and decreases with the innovation size. They …nd that the balance of these two e¤ects depend on the innovation size: the merger is privately pro…table for small innovations, in fact for large innovations the outside option faced by the external patentee is low and so it has little relevance with respect to the availability of two instruments. In our model the merger is pro…table for any innovation size . In particular, in contrast with Sandonis and Faulì-Oller (2006) the internal patentee approaches the monopoly outcome as the innovation size increases. In fact, the VI …rm has incentive to reduce as much as possible the quantity produced by the nona¢ liate, in order to internalize as much as possible the vertical externality (in the limit, if allowed, the VI …rm would completely foreclose the rival …rm compensating it via a negative …xed fee). However the VI …rm is constrained by the nona¢ liate outside option: the higher the lower is this outside option and so the lower the quantity that the nona¢ liate produces and in turn the more the VI …rm approaches the monopoly outcome. The outside option for the external patentee is i (0; r j ; s; s ) decreasing in and increasing in r j . The outside option for the internal patentee is 1 (0; 0; s; s ) = 2 s (4 1)
2 independent of r and decreasing in . For low , both outside options are large. There is the same negative e¤ect of Sandonis and Faulì-Oller (2006) related to the external patentee and so vertical integration dominates vertical separation. For high , both outside options are small, however also in this case vertical integration dominates as the internal patentee approches the monopoly outcome.
As for social welfare, in contrast with Sandonis and Faulì-Oller (2006) we …nd that, under homogeneous goods, vertical integration is privately and socially pro…table for high quality improvements. Vertical integration has two opposite e¤ects on prices: on one hand, VI pushes prices down as it implies the (partial) internalization of the vertical externality; on the other hand, VI has an anticompetitive e¤ect because the VI …rm is able to (partially) foreclose the rival …rm via a positive per-unit royalty. The …rst e¤ect prevails for high (and we have p V I p T < 0), the opposite e¤ect prevails for low (and we have p V I p T > 0).
Bertrand competition
We next extend our analysis to Bertrand competition. This extension allows us to analyse a post-innovation scenario with product di¤erentiation. Indeed the innovator has no incentive to sell its product innovation to both …rms, as under Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods, market pro…ts are equal to zero and therefore he could not extract any surplus from the licensees. Ex-ante, as goods are homogeneous, equilibrium price is equal to marginal cost, set to zero. Therefore, the market is covered, i.e., the demand is equal to one; …rms make zero pro…t and social welfare coincide with consumer surplus that is:
Under Bertrand competition, the patent holder will sell the new input to only one …rm (otherwise the Bertrand paradox applies). We thus analyse the optimal contract under exclusive licensing, considering in turn the case of an external patentee and the case of an internal patentee. Suppose as before that …rm 1 is the non-innovating …rm that produces a …nal good of quality s 1 = s at price p 1 ; …rm 2 is the innovating …rm that produces a …nal good of quality s 2 = s > s, at price p 2 . The demands for the goods are the same as in (5) and (6), in particular:
Bertrand competition leads to the following third stage prices and quantity equilibrium: Namely,
.
The …rst constraint comes from the non-negativity of q 2 and the second constraint (binding at equilibrium) ensures that …rm 2 has the incentive to get the license rather than the outside option, that we assume to be equal to 1 (0; r 2 ; s; s ) > 0.
11 The optimal contract is:
A product innovation is sold via a …xed fee, this is due to the fact that the rival …rm has zero marginal cost. 12 This result is in contrast with a process innovation (Muto, 1993) . Remaining equilibrium variables are:
B U is the U patent holder pro…t under exclusive licensing, when selling via a two-part tari¤, which reduces to a …xed fee, the new input to only one D …rm. For completeness we provide equilibrium consumer surplus under Bertrand competition:
Consider next the case of an internal patentee, in particular assume that the U producer and …rm 2 merge. The VI …rm does not sell the innovation to the 1 1 In fact …rm 2 can always refuse the o¤er of the patent holder knowing that he will make the o¤er to the rival …rm. Therefore the outside option is not zero (the status quo pro…t), rather it is positive and equal to the low quality …rm's pro…t. 1 2 If the rival …rm had a positive marginal cost of production, say c > 0, (so that the innovation would include the product as well as the process) then the optimal contract would
rival so that we have an equilibrium such that the VI …rm produces the high quality good at zero costs and compete with the rival …rm 1 that produces the low quality good at zero cost. Equilibrium quantities, prices and CS are as in (13), (14) and (15), equilibrium pro…ts are
As for the merger private and social pro…tability under Bertrand competition we …nd that:
The patent holder is indi¤erent between staying out of the market and vertically integrate. The same holds from the social welfare point of view. The above results are gathered in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Under Bertrand competition the patent holder always prefers exclusive licensing. (i) An external patent holder prefers to sell its product innovation via a …xed fee rather than a royalty (the optimal contract is speci…ed in (12)).
(ii) An internal patent holder does not license its innovation. (iii) The equilibrium prices, quantities and social welfare are independent of whether the patent holder stays out of the market or vertically integrate with either …rm.
We conclude our analysis by comparing the private and social pro…tability of Cournot vs Bertrand competition. Under Cournot competition, at equilibrium vertical integration takes place and technology di¤usion is complete, so that we have a homogeneous high quality good in the market; in constrast under Bertrand competition, at equilibrium exclusive licensing occurs, so that the market is vertically di¤erentiated.
We …nd that from the …rms' point of view, the producer surplus is higher under Cournot than under Bertrand competition, namely: 
As for consumer surplus and welfare, the comparison depends on the quality improvement, in particular total social welfare is higher under Cournot than under Bertrand competition for su¢ ciently high:
This result is clearly linked to the fact that on one hand, under Cournot, competition is milder than under Bertrand where both qualities stays on sale; on the other hand, under Cournot, complete technology di¤usion arises so that the average quality is higher than under Bertrand competition.
Conclusion
We have analysed the optimal licensing strategy of an upstream input innovator producing a new input which improves the quality of the …nal goods. We have considered a duopoly downstream market and have shown that under Cournot competition complete technology di¤usion takes place and the innovator always prefers to be inside the market as the vertical merger with either downstream …rm is always privately pro…table. It is also welfare improving for large innovations. In contrast, under Bertrand competition exclusive licensing takes place and we …nd an indi¤erent result between vertical integration and vertical separation from both the private and social welfare point of view.
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